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Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A
Question of Judicial Responsibility
By RoGER I. TRAYNoR*

There is an alluring ring of the future in a term like prospective
overruling of judicial decisions. At the same time its kinship to
statutes deceptively fosters the impression that decisions can bask in
the ancient history of the principle originating in the Roman law that
statutes operate prospectively only.

In 1250 Bracton declared that

principle anew. Eventually Coke incorporated it into the English
common law,' and by the seventeenth century it was an accepted rule
of statutory construction in common law courts that statutes operate
only prospectively.

The rule bespoke the view of lawyers and judges

that retroactive operation would be inherently unfair.

By the time

of Blackstone that view had evolved into the principle that statutes

operate prospectively by their very nature. A statute could not be
effective before it was enacted; ergo, it could not apply to events that
preceded its enactment.
These views crossed the Atlantic Ocean and gained constitutional
authority in the ex post facto clause and the impairment of contracts
clause of the United States Constitution. The due process clause also
served to militate against retroactive statutes that afforded no opportunity
for notice or fair hearing.'
* A.B. 1923, Ph.D. & J.D. 1927, University of California. Justice of the California Supreme Court, 1940-64. Chief Justice of California, 1964-70. Sir Arthur
Goodhart Professor of Legal Science, University of Cambridge, England, 1974-75. Honorary Professor of Legal Ethics, University of Birmingham, England, 1974-75. Roger
J. Traynor Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
This article was originally presented as a lecture in 1975 at the University of
Birmingham. The Hastings Law Journal gratefully acknowledges the permission to
reprint the lecture granted by the University of Birmingham.
1. See Schulman, Retroactive Legislation, in 7 ENCYC. Soc. Sc. 356 (1937);
Smead, The Rule Againist Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence,
20 MiNN. L. REv. 775 (1936).
2. Thus, a statute that reduced the period of adverse possession from twenty
years to six after a six-year period had already run against the owner was held void
as taking of property without due process of law. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230
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Since there are no comparable constitutional restrictions in England, Parliament is free to make or alter the law retroactively, even to the
extent of depriving a successful party to litigation of the fruits of his
victory. Thus, in Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate3 the plaintiff's
property near Rangoon was destroyed under British military orders
the day before Japanese authorities occupied Rangoon. After the war
the plaintiff sought compensation under the common law, since legislation providing compensation for war damage did not apply to the
case. The House of Lords upheld the plaintiff's claim. Shortly thereafter an Act of Parliament abolished retroactively the common law
right of compensation declared by the House of Lords and nullified
the plaintiffs judgment.4 Perhaps this case will be viewed as an extraordinary instance of the sovereignty of Parliament and not as a
precedent to be invoked by any transient parliamentary majority for
new jolts to the principle of judicial independence. Meanwhile, we
can only rely on Parliament's own respect for judicial independence
and its own self-restraint to confine such jolts to the most extraordinary situations. Given such restraint the singular pouring of Burmah Oil on judicial waterways may engender not trouble but reassurance, as Professor Arthur Goodhart maintains, of the strength of the
fluid English constitution:
The English doctrine that the general principles of the common law
are supreme but that in certain circumstances exceptions can be
made to them, has enabled the constitution to continue with only
one violent break for over eight hundred years. 5
Although statutes normally operate prospectively only, judicial
decisions normally operate retroactively as well as prospectively. The
mundane explanation is that a judicial decision, relating to events that
have already occurred, naturally looks backward. That common sense
must be taken with the essential grain of salt. A judge is bound to make
constant use of the eyes at the back of his head, but he has also a reU.S. 139 (1913).

In a later case the Court held that retroactive overruling in combina-

tion with the running of the statute of limitations denied due process of law. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
The courts, however, did not regard all retroactive statutes as evil. They found
some, such as curative statutes, necessary or desirable. See Ballard, Retroactive Federal
Taxation, 48 HAv. L. REV. 592 (1935); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1
(1916).
Nevertheless, such examples of retroactivity are still exceptions to the rule of
prospective operation for statutes. For the most part they dare not look back in the
United States lest they turn into a pillar of unconstitutionality.

3.

[1965] A.C. 75.

4.
5.

War Damages Act of 1965.
Goodhart, The Burmah Oil Case and War Damage Act 1965, 82 L.Q. REV.

97 (1966).
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sponsibility to keep a weather eye forward. I take my stand with this

modem view the better to emphasize the need for occasional exceptions
to the normally retroactive operation of judicial decisions. For all too
many generations we justified mechanical retroactivity by the prim

lore descended to us through Blackstone that judges do no more than
discover the law that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only
the judicial pen that would find the right words for all to heed.

Once suitably bundled up it was automatically retroactive, given
the premise that it had been there all along in the bushes at the

bottom of the garden. The devotees of the discovery theory majestically dispelled the fractious problem of the overruled decision.
The overruling decision simply displaced it all the way back in time
so that it never had a life it could call its own. Under the spell of

such moonspinning, American courts soon upheld a retroactive operation of decisions that they would have invalidated in statutes as contrary to the ex post facto clause, the impairment of contracts clause,
or the due process clause of the Constitution."
Like many another myth, 7 the myth that judges discovered rather

than created law, surviving well into the twentieth century, engendered rituals that have outlived it.

The ritual of mechanical retroac-

tivity of judicial decision came to have its own rationalizations, affording no leeway for exceptions.

The conviction that a new judicial rule

is more just than an old one is still likely to carry the topheavy inference that such a rule achieves maximum justice by retroactive application. There are no questions asked about countervailing injustice
6. See, e.g., Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1924); Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913). See also
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
385, 389 (1798).
7. See Address by Lord Diplock, Presidential Address, The Holdsworth Club,
1965. There Lord Diplock, speaking on 'The Courts as Legislators," said, "But judgemade law, as I have pointed out, is in theory retrospective. A precedent which reverses
or modifies a previous precedent is applicable to all such cases which are tried subsequently even though they arise out of acts done before the new precedent was laid down.
This is unjust, and because it is unjust it is itself'a factor which makes the courts more
hesitant than they would otherwise be to correct previous errors or to adapt an established rule of conduct to changed conditions. And yet the rule that a new precedent
applies to acts done before it was laid down is not an essential feature of the judicial
process. It is a consequence of a legal fiction that the Courts merely expound the law
as it has always been. The time has come, I suggest, to reflect whether we should discard this fiction." See also Lord Reid, The Judge As Lawmaker, 12 J. Soc'Y PUB.
TEAcHERs L. (New Series) 22 (1972). There the author said, "There was a time when
it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges make law-they only declare it.
Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some Aladdin's Cave
there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and that on a judge's appoint-
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to those who have relied on the old rule. Neither is there any eyeopening comparison with a new statute, which may also be superior
in justice to a judicial rule that it displaces, but which will ordinarily
be construed to have prospective operation only.
We might well quit ourselves of superficial rationalization for retroactive operation of judicial rules, admitting of no exceptions, for we
can better justify their retroactive operation, admitting of reasonable
exceptions, by the very reasoning that justified stare decisis as a prevailing principle, admitting of reasonable exceptions.
A persuasive justification of the retroactive operation of judicial
decisions and of the Blackstone conception, without its mythical trappings, has been advanced by Professor Paul Mishkin:
Actually, while the Blackstonian conception is not entirely valid,
neither is it wholly wrong. For it is certainly true that courts in
general handle the vast bulk of cases by application of preexisting
law; indeed even when "new law" must be made, it is often in
fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear implications
of values so generally shared in the society that the process might
well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law. Moreover,
this must inevitably be so. For it is the basic role of courts to
decide disputes after they have arisen. That function requires that
judicial decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive
effect. In turn, unless those decisions (at least ordinarily) reflect
preexisting rules or values, such retroactivity would be intolerable. s
Stare decisis signifies the basic characteristic of the judicial process that differentiates it from the legislative processf In the legislative process there is neither beginning nor end. It is an endless freement there descends on him knowledge of the magic words Open Sesame . . . . But we
do not believe in fairy tales any more." See generally A. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH
LAW (2d ed. 1968).
8. Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and

Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 60 (1965).

One writer stated that "[t]o serve its highest

aims, a legal system must have the stability and predictability essential to security, order,

and evenhanded justice. If it is to continue even for generations and the more clearly
if it is to survive still longer, it must also have flexibility to change and ability to grow
with the institutions and society it serves-the capacity, in short, to renew itself."
Preface to R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE at v (1969). See also Freeman,
Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling, 26 CuR-

166, 179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Freeman]. Another author has said: "The art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic
RENT LEGAL PROBLEMS

code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision to secure that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot combine rev-

erence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either from
anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows."
SYMBOLISM:

ITS MEANING AND EFFECT

A.

WHITEHEAD,

88 (1927).

9. See the excellent exposition of the characteristics that distinguish judges from
legislators in Freeman, supra note 8, at 174-80.
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wheeling experiment, without institutional restraints, that may have
rational origins and procedures and goals or that may lack them. In
contrast, a judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point; he
is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral judicial
experience: the given decisions or, lacking these, the given clues.
Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that he confronts a
truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in the context
of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the past; by its kinship
thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent
for the future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but always unbroken line with the past.
A judge is constrained not only to heed the relevant judicial past
in arriving at a decision, but also to arrive at it within as straight and
narrow a path as possible. Unlike a legislator, he cannot undertake
broad investigations beyond the case before him. He is confined by
the record in the case, which in turn is confined to legally relevant
material, limited by evidentiary rules. So it happens that even a decision of far-reaching importance concludes with the words: "We hold
today only that. . . . We do not reach the question whether. .. ."
The very circumspection of the judicial process enhances the significance of a decision. No one is apt to take it lightly, knowing how
intently a judge must hew to the record before him. It offers no reforestation or defoliation program, but what it decides about a single
tree may give new perspective to the forest. Indeed, one might describe the ideal, the well-tempered decision as one that affords such
perspective. It is not laden with ancient phrases harking backward;
neither is it freighted with seven-league words for an ambitious march
on the future. The well-tempered decision knows how to take graceful leave of a dark landmark that is no longer on its mark, but takes
care to refrain from all-purpose guidance for all that lies ahead. It
knows how to keep its place in time. 10
Such a decision affords a court a modicum of flexibility within
its severe constraints. Insofar as a decision remains uncommitted to
drastic implications, a court gains time to inform itself further
through succeeding cases. It is then better situated to retreat or advance with a minimum of shock to those who act in reliance upon judicial decisions. The greatest judges of the common law have proceeded
in this way, moving not by fits and starts, but at the pace of a tortoise
10. See generally Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The WellBeing of the Law, 53 CAL. L. REv. 151, 158-59 (1965).
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that explores every inch of the way, steadily making advances though
it carries the past on its back. The slow motion of the judicial process,
perhaps too summarily summarized as stare decisis, not only benefits
the long-range evolution of the law, but also affords substantial protection against arbitrary judicial decision. Moreover, the legislature
is always free to displace judicial rules with its own statutes.
Even when relevant precedents emerge, a judge can take hope
prematurely. No sooner does one line of precedent become clear
enough to command attention than another may appear that seems
equally impressive. In a mass of uncertainty lies a variety of precedents, and a judge makes selection upon selection before reaching his
decision. The precedents are writ in type that moves like water and
they are not holy writ.
Though there is not always so baffling a choice to make, the manifold problem of precedent engenders other difficulties. A judge coming upon a precedent that he might not himself have established will
ordinarily feel impelled to follow it to maintain the stability in the
law that has value per se. Better the settled precedents that have
proved reasonably acceptable and are reasonably in tune with the
times than endless reexaminations that create uncertainty without ensuring improvement. The serviceable consistency of stare decisis
rightly discourages displacement of precedent, absent overwhelming
countervailing considerations. It also rightly discourages specious distinctions that confuse more than they clarify.
There are, of course, precedents originally so unsatisfactory or
grown so unsatisfactory with time as to deserve liquidation. Unfortunately a court often lacks the forthrightness to bring about their
demise. Instead it may pursue the unhappy alternatives of keeping
them alive and kicking irrationally or of sustaining them half alive.
It may blindly follow precedent only because it lacks the wit or the
will or the courage to spell out why the precedent no longer deserves
to be followed. It may deem itself helpless to overrule its precedents,
as the Court of Appeal apparently still does in view of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co." despite Lord Denning's efforts to escape the bonds
of that case. La Rochefoucauld reminds us that "[wlhen laziness and
12
timidity yoke us to our duties, we often give virtue the credit for it.'
In Caerphilly Concrete Products Ltd. v. Owen' 3 a sense of helpless11.
12.
13.

[1944] 1 K.B. 718.
LA RocHEFoucAuLD, MAXIMS, No. 169 at 64 (L. Kronenberger transl. 1959).

[1972] 1 W.L.R. 372 (C.A.).
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ness may have been the yoke to duty. A lease for a term of five years
contained a clause giving the tenant a right to another lease for a further term of five years "at the same rent and containing the like covenants and provisos as are herein contained (including an option to
renew such lease for the further term of five years at the expiration
"..
14 In concluding reluctantly that this clause made the
thereo) ..
lease perpetually renewable, Lord Justice Sachs declared:
Not even the most impeccable conveyancing logic, however neatly
expressed, can convince me that in the instant case it was the
mutual intention of the parties that the lease should be perpetually
renewable.... It is difficult indeed ...to think that two business
men would be talking in terms of five years if both-or indeed
either-of them truly meant that a lease should be granted which
went on ad infinitum.
An examination of the relevant decisions discloses an area
of law in which the courts have manoeuvred themselves into an
unhappy position.... [B]y strict adherence to precedent relating
to the phrase 'including the present covenant' when following a
covenant conferring a right to a renewal on the like covenants and
provisos as are contained in the first lease, they appear to have
bound themselves to hold that the use of a certain set of words...
causes the lease to be perpetually renewable, even when no layman.., would dream of granting such a lease and, if aware of the
technical meaning of the particular phraseology, would almost certainly be aghast at its devastating effect and refuse to sign. One
reason for the courts so binding themselves is said to, be that the
formula is one of the effect of which is well known to trained
conveyancers, and that this is advantageous, however much of a
trap it may constitute for others.
On the issue of the intentions of the parties the law had
become the prisoner of the machinery. 5
Reasonable expectations of the parties would not be upset by
overruling such a case. It is difficult to believe that a "trained" and
reputable conveyancer would rely on precedents to create such a trap
for an unsuspecting lessor. Res judicata would sustain the old interpretation of the clause in leases that had already been finally litigated,
since final judgments in such cases would be immune from collateral
attack.
Such dogmatic adherence to the past perpetuates bad law. It is
hardly the lesser of two evils to postpone the making of good law by
crowding an unfortunate precedent with distinctions instead of retiring it forthwith. It then lingers on, leaving counsel puzzled as to what
strange complications will next attend its lingering illness. On the
14. Id. at 375.
15. Id. at 375-77.
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unpredictable retirement date a formal overruling is too often attended by a cavalier pronouncement that the precedent must be
deemed to have revealed itself as superannuated in the lengthening
shadows of the newcomers. Such a pronouncement comes late to
those who had long suspected it was overdue but had still to reckon
with the possibility that it might not materialize.
Courts are often so dismayed by the extent of an unnecessary evil
as to retreat into defeatism. The case law has come to such a state,
they are wont to say, that only the legislature can set things aright.
Ironically, judges themselves are all too ready to seize on this rationalization to shift to others the responsibility of overruling judge-made
bad law. This is evasion, not mere abstentious avoidance of judicial
responsibility. The time is ripe for redress and no one can undertake
it more appropriately than the judges themselves. Their inaction
speaks louder than words to perpetuate error and confusion.
Always there is the danger that an effort to induce a court to
abandon or revise an outmoded common law rule may result only in
resanctifying it. If the court adheres to stare decisis, as it is wont to
do, with an aloof statement that the question is one for the legislature
-although it is one created by judicial decision-it creates not only
a new halo for the old rule, but a precedent that it is not within the
province of the court to make a change. Thus doubly haloed the rule
becomes judicially untouchable.
A bad precedent is doubly evil because it has not only inflicted
hardship but threatens to continue doing so. When a judge resolves at last to overrule it, however, he confronts the immediate problem of how much reliance the precedent engendered. Reliance in one
case of enormous repercussions? Reliance in many cases of small but
cumulatively strong repercussions? No serious reliance at all in view
of the mocking distinctions attending a precedent? A judge is mindful
that an overruling is normally retroactive but also mindful of the traditional antipathy toward retroactive law that springs from its recurring association with injustice. He must reckon with the possibility
that a retroactive overruling could entail substantial hardship. He
may nevertheless be impelled to make such an overruling if the hardships it would impose upon those who have relied upon the precedent
appear not so great as the hardships that would inure to those who
would remain saddled with a bad precedent. An immediate consideration will be that statutes of limitations, by putting an end to old
causes of action, markedly cut down the number of possible hardship
cases.
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No modem judge adheres to precedent ritualistically, but in the
main he honors it for good reason, for the endlessly useful solutions
it makes available to him by way of example as he confronts each puzzle to which something new has been added. If the puzzle still proves
intractable to solution in familiar ways, a judge is still likely to do
honor to the precedent in the breach, setting forth clearly the disparity between the square facts before him and the often well-rounded
precedents that now fail to match them. He has also the responsibility of justifying the new precedent he has evolved not merely as the
dispossessor of the old, but as the best of all possible replacements.
He is hardly eager to take on so demanding a responsibility if he
can do otherwise. He knows that a new rule must be supported by
the full disclosure in his opinion of all aspects of the problem and of
the data pertinent to its solution. Thereafter the opinion must pass
muster with scholars and practitioners on the alert to note any misunderstanding of the problem, any error in reasoning, any irrelevance
in data, any oversight of relevant data, any premature cartography
beyond the problem in hand. Every opinion is thus subject to approval.

Moreover, however moribund he finds a precedent, he may still
be deterred from displacing it by another restraint of judicial office,
the tradition that the function of a court is not itself to innovate
changes but only to keep the law responsive to significant changes in
the customs of the community. Normally the judge will abide by the
tenet that the law must lag a respectful pace back of popular mores,
not only to insure its own acceptance but also to delay legal formalization of community values until they have become seasoned. That tradition makes good sense so long as the lag does not deteriorate into
a lapse.
When a judge does overrule a precedent, it matters little whether
it related only to the common law or to the interpretation of a constitution or statute. Often a statute itself has codified rules of common
law, and in any event a judge arrives at his decision via reasoning native to the common law. Hence the context of the case ordinarily does
not affect the prevailing rule that an overruling decision operates retroactively.
It is my opinion that however sound this prevailing rule may be
in the main, it can on occasion unduly restrict the development of the
law. A court usually will not overrule a precedent even if it is convinced that the precedent is unsound, when the hardship caused by
a retroactive change would not be offset by its benefits. The tech-
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nique of prospective overruling enables courts to solve this dilemma
by changing bad law without upsetting the reasonable expectations
of those who relied on it.' 6 Only occasionally will there be cases that
clearly demand this technique. 1 7 In the hands of skilled judicial

craftsmen, acting under well-reasoned guidelines, it can be an instrument of justice that fosters public respect for the law.18 Although
the technique is frequently invoked in overruling precedents, it can
serve in any case in which new rules are announced.
16. For a detailed history of the origin and development of the idea of prospective
overruling, see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence And Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 17-25 (1965). See also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 14749 (1921); R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE (1969); Address by Justice Cardozo,
New York State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932, in 55 N.Y. ST. B. ASs'N REP. 263
(1932); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of An Overruling ConstitutionalDecision: Mapp
v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965); Freeman, supra note 8;
Friedland, Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. TORONTO L.J.
170 (1974); Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking And Prospective Overruling, 29
MODERN L. REV. 593 (1966); Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought": A Call
For The End Of The Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969); Meador,
Habeas Corpus And The "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1964); Mishkin,
The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 56 (1965); Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective
Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1967); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 719 (1966); Snyder,
Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 U. ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940); Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in The Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application].
17. The "element of surprise will not realistically be an operative factor in a great
many cases because the parties will have acted without any knowledge at all of what
the governing law was; whatever law is finally held to govern their conduct, whether
it be the old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule to them." Prospective Overruling
and Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 945. I believe that most judges would
agree with Cardozo: "My impression is that the instances of honest reliance and genuine disappointment are rarer than they are commonly supposed to be by those who exalt
the virtues of stability and certainty." Address by Justice Cardozo, New York State Bar
Association, Jan. 22, 1932, in 55 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N REP. 295 (1932).
18. But see Freeman, supra note 8, at 207: "It has been part of my thesis that
rules contain within themselves social objectives and policy choices, and that judicial
law-making which works within this ambit is legitimate. Prospective overruling does not
and, in spite of superficial attractions, it is a technique which does not commend itself."
Sir Leslie Scarman, then chairman of the English Law Commission and now a member
of the Court of Appeal, commented: "I have difficulty in understanding the bifurcation
of the judicial process. . . which all of us know has been achieving a measure of employment in various states of the United States of America. I find it difficult to understand how a judge can say a case will be decided in this way for the parties in front
of him but to give notice that in the future it will be decided in a different way for
different parties who may come later. This seems, to my mind, a straining or distortion
of the judicial process which we should avoid if we can .......
Scarman, Law Reform
by Legislative Techniques, 32 SAsx. L. REv. 217, 219-20 (1967).
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Amid the current lively interest in the prospective operation of
an overruling decision, particularly in the United States, it is worth

recalling various decisions specifying such operation, covering a long
space of time. They have a common objective, to rid the law of an
unsound rule and at the same time preclude undue hardship to a party

that has justifiably relied on it. Reliance plays its heaviest role in
such areas as property, contracts, and taxation, where lawyers advise
clients extensively in their planning on the basis of existing precedents.
In most of the decisions I shall now review briefly, overruling was
the rational judgment and prospective overruling was essential to preclude the injustice that retroactive application of the new rule would
have entailed. Thus the early municipal bond cases, to prevent gross
injustice, precluded retroactive application of new rules. In 1863 the
United States Supreme Court in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque1 9 refused
to give retroactive effect to a decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa,

holding certain municipal bonds invalid and noting that plaintiffs had
purchased such bonds in reliance on an earlier decision of that court
holding them valid.2 0

Other early cases limiting new rules to prospective application in
the interest of justice also involved property rights. Thus, in 1892 the
Alabama Supreme Court, ruling in Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co. 2' on
the vesting of legal title to property, took care to give the rule prospective application only. Similarly the North Carolina Supreme Court

in 1906 approved the prospective application for decisions overruling
settled rules of property or contract rights, on the ground that the
"highest principles of justice" militate against divestment of rights acquired in reliance on prior law.22

19. 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175 (1863). See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
4 HAuv. L. R~v. 311 (1891).
20. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court explicitly applied prospectively a
rule invalidating municipal bonds in a situation similar to Gelpcke: "After a statute has
been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights
acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and
a change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts
as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment." Douglass v. County
of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879). From this language state courts and federal courts
subsequently carved out a "contract right" or "property right" to preclude retroactivity.
The objective was to foster stability in commercial transactions.
21. 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892).
22. See Hill v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906). Sometimes a court tolerates indefinitely the vicious circle of a defective old rule and reliance
thereon, even though the old rule may have been unsound from its inception. See my
concurring opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 1,45 P.2d 312 (1944). See also
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The legislative divorce cases afford another early exception to the
retroactive application of a court decision. Thus the Supreme Court
of Ohio, in holding legislative divorces invalid, refused to apply its decision retroactively to invalidate prior legislative divorces that had
been granted over a period of more than forty years.2 3 The court
noted that retroactive application would have invalidated numerous
second marriages and rendered illegitimate many children born of
24
such marriages.
The leading case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 25 involved a Montana statute that granted rate-fixing authority to the state railroad commission. The Montana Supreme
Court had authorized a right of reparation to shippers or carriers unreasonably burdened by a rate modification. Sunburst had accordingly sued Great Northern for reparation. Then the Montana Supreme Court, overruling its earlier decision, held that the right of
reparation did not exist. Nonetheless it permitted Sunburst to recover
because the old rule had been "the governing principle for shippers
and carriers who, during the period of its reign, had acted on the faith
of it ....
-26 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether Great Northern had been denied due process and
held that no federal question was raised by the prospective overruling.
The significance of reliance was also dominant in Hare v. General
Contract Purchasing Corp.2 7 The Supreme Court of Arkansas had
held in several cases that a form of instalment contract did not
violate a prohibition in the Arkansas Constitution of interest rates in
excess of 10 percent. When the same form of contract was again before the court in the Hare case, the court found that the contract was
usurious but applied the new rule prospectively because of the many
contracts that had been entered into in reliance on the court's earlier
decisions.
A salient example of the prospective application of an overruling
decision is the case of Brown v. Board of Education2 s holding that the
Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property ControlRule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CAL. L. REv. 476 (1945); Comment,
Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legislation Decreasing Husband's Power of Control Over Property Already Acquired, 27 CAL. L. RPv. 49 (1938).
23. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 49 Am. Dec. 471 (1848).
24. Id. at 448-49, 49 Am. Dec. at 473-74.
25. 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927, aff'd, 287 U.S. 353 (1952).
26. 287 U.S. at 358.
27. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In two cases the Supreme Court
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state action involved in segregated schools violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Normally, state action
that has been declared unconstitutional would be promptly terminated. Given the massive adjustment necessitated by the decision,
however, the United States Supreme Court framed its decision in
terms of the now famous equitable injunction calling for compliance
"with all deliberate speed," a phrase that enabled the court to have
its new rule take effect in slow motion.
Eight years went by. Then the Court, in the 1963 case of Watson
v. City of Memphis,29 held that enough time for deliberate speed had
elapsed and that desegregation must now proceed in earnest.
The extraordinary technique of the Brown decision, allowing an
unspecified time for adjustment, was the only possible way of ensuring orderly transition from an old social order to a new. Millions of
people were involved in the transition, and they could hardly be maneuvered at a moment's notice like small platoons of plaintiffs or defendants. There would be adjustments to make for those who had
clamored for change as well as for those who had resisted it. Each
group needed time to expand its familiar province and to learn to live
in a wider world. The judicial decision signaling the change was no
simple decision weighing one individual's benefits or hardships against
another's. It contemplated a long-range benefit for everyone concerned, and abundant time was of the essence to ensure that objective.
There would have been great risk of its failure had the court ordered
its decision to take effect at an appointed hour or even in an appointed
year. Better an interim of trial and error, however bumbling, with
time and time again to heal the breach.
In each of the foregoing cases an unsound rule was properly displaced, but the new rule was not applied retroactively because the
hardship that retroactivity would entail clearly outweighed its benefits. In tort cases, however, it is my opinion that the hardship on parties who would be saddled with an unjust precedent if the overruling
were not made retroactive, ordinarily outweighs any hardship on those
who acted under the old rule or any benefits that might be derived
from limiting the new rule to prospective operation. Neither the tortruled that legislative districts be apportioned according to a "one man, one vote" principle. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Note the prospectivity involved in implementing this new rule. See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964).
29. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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feasor nor the victim normally takes account of expanding or contracting rules of tort liability except tangentially in the course of routinely
insuring against such liability.
In most cases, the expansion or contraction of tort liability has
no drastic effect on the drafting and cost of insurance policies, but
there may be exceptions. An agency, for example, relying on sovereign or charitable immunity under established law, may have
deemed it needless to procure insurance. In the event of a judicial
decision ruling against immunity such an agency would be unprepared
to meet the newly created liability.
Decisions in several jurisdictions overruling sovereign or charitable immunity have sought to guard against hardship in this regard,
but not satisfactorily. Thus in Illinois the court accorded the benefit
of a decision overruling school district immunity to the plaintiff, but
declared that apart from the instant case, the rule would apply prospectively only.30 Such a solution can result in grossly unequal treatment of persons similarly situated. It was bound to raise the question
of why there should not be comparable benefit for others, including
those injured in the same accident, whose potential claims were not
yet barred by the statute of limitations or litigated to final judgment
that would raise the bar of res judicata. I can find no rational justification for distinguishing between tort victims injured before and after
an overruling decision. The hardship on the injured persons would
seem clearly to outweigh the hardship on the taxpayers of the community among whom the damages would be distributed. Even if the
agency saw no need to investigate the alleged tort or prepare a defense, given its reliance on the old rule, any hardship that might result from its failure to make a possibly adequate defense would be
outweighed by the hardship on the injured who would be denied any
remedy under an unjust rule.
It is equally specious to contend that the party attacking the old
rule should be given the benefit of the new rule as a reward for litigating the issue, 3 ' with a consequent incentive to others to attack unsound doctrine. Such a contention is precariously based on frustration
of evenhanded justice. If a case impels a brief for overruling, the possibility of retroactive application should be incentive enough and
counsel must accept the risk that the court will not overrule, let alone
retroactively. Most cases involve more than one issue, and there is
30. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959).
31. See id. at 28, 163 N.E.2d at 97.
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always the risk of failure on some or all of them. As Cardozo has
noted, "the chance of miscalculation is felt to be a fair risk of the game
."32 Furthermore, institutional litigants with recurring inof life ...
terests in overturning legal rules would find incentive and reward
enough in achieving only prospective overruling. There might be
merit in the argument that counsel would lack incentive to attack unsound doctrine if prospective overruling ever became so common that
it could be generally anticipated, but that prospect is remote.
The Minnesota court straddled the issue of prospective versus retroactive operation of an overruling decision with an unusual solution
that has been labelled "prospective-prospective" overruling. 3 3 It declared that the defense of sovereign immunity would no longer be available to school districts, municipal corporations, and certain other governmental subdivisions with respect to torts committed after the
adjournment of the next regular session of the Minnesota legislature.34
Its objective was to give the agencies time to insure and to leave the
way open for the legislature to enlist its abundant resources for comprehensive legislation in the area. The clear implication was that the
formulation of new rules in this area was a responsibility more appropriate to the legislature than to the courts. That implication was at
odds with an attendant warning that the court would undertake the legislature's responsibility if the legislature did not. It seems evident that
the real, though unarticulated, reason for prospective overruling in the
charitable and sovereign immunity cases was to forestall legislative opposition to the new rules.
It would be more rational in such cases for a court to decide for
retroactive operation. The California court so decided, in a decision
liquidating the doctrine of sovereign immunity.3 5 It reasoned that the
doctrine had been almost uniformly condemned by the commentators,
and had become so riddled with exceptions, via legislation as well as
judicial decision, that "[o]nly the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity have survived; its requiem has long been foreshad32. B. CARDozo, THa NATURE OF TFE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1921).
33. See Note, Prospective-ProspectiveOverruling, 51 MINN. L. REv. 79 (1966).
34. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118
N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962). In an earlier case, the court overruled the doctrine of charitable immunity, saying "[w]e believe the new rule should apply to the instant case and
to all future causes of action arising after September 15, 1960, the date of the filing
of this opinion." Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 28, 105 N.W.2d 1, 14
(1960).
35. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961).
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owed."3 6 Under such circumstances, any hardship to the agency that
had failed to take note of the fatal illness of the old rule was overwhelmed by the hardship that a denial of recovery would have worked
on the injured plaintiff.
The problem of retroactive versus prospective application calls for
the most sensitive balancing of competing claims to justice in the area
of criminal law. The time radius of the decision may directly affect
the freedom or the very life of one accused or convicted of crime. An
ex post facto clause hence exerts its most dramatic prohibition against
retroactivity with regard to statutes that make conduct criminal that has
not been criminal before. Though there is no comparable prohibition
on a court,17 it usually also guards against any retroactive application
of a decision that marks conduct as criminal for the first time.
In an early case in North Carolina3 8 the court found its rationale
for prospective application in the defendant's reliance on an old interpretation of the law. He had been prosecuted under a statute prohibiting unauthorized removal of crops by a sharecropper. An earlier
case3 9 involving the same statute had held that a sharecropper might
defend by alleging the landlord's breach of contract as offsetting the
amount of rent due. The court overruled the earlier decision, holding
that the statute plainly meant that the crops were to remain on the land
until all disputes between landlord and sharecropper were resolved and
that any removal of the crops pending such settlement was a penal offense. The court went on to hold, however, that since the defendant
might have acted on the advice of counsel in reliance on the earlier
case, it would be unfair to deprive him of the defense authorized by
that case.
In the unusual New Mexico case of State v. Jones40 the court saw
anew a former defendant. Some years earlier, as the operator of a motion picture theatre he had used "bank night" to promote attendance,
a common practice during the depression. He was successful in his
defense that "bank night" was not a lottery. Now the same court concluded, as to the same defendant, that "bank night" was a lottery but
held that the "plainest principles of justice"4 1 demanded that the new
36. Id. at 221, 359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
37. See note 6 supra.

38. See State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904).
39. See State v. Neal, 129 N.C. 692, 40 S.E. 205 (1901).
40. 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). See also State v.Longino, 109 Miss. 125,
67 So. 902 (1915).
41. 44 N.M.at 631, 107 P.2d at 329.
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rule be applied prospectively only. The court's second thought could
not make a lottery of the justifiable reliance its old rule engendered
in the very defendant again before the court.
Normally, however, reliance plays an inconsequential role, if any,
in criminal cases, as in tort cases. The decisive factor is usually the
injustice of retroactivity, given its penal consequences, as exemplified
in the case of James v. United States.42 At issue was the conviction
of a defendant for "wilfully and knowingly" evading payment of an income tax on embezzled money. In an earlier case4 3 the United States
Supreme Court had held that embezzled funds were not taxable income. Six members of the Court in the James case voted to overrule
that decision, holding that embezzled funds were taxable income. A
differently composed group of six justices, however, voted not to convict James; three on the ground that the old rule still prevailed when
he failed to pay the tax, and hence made it impossible to prove wilful
evasion; and three on the ground that the old rule was correct. Accordingly, there was no retroactive application of the new interpretation
of the statute. It is hardly persuasive that James failed to report his
income in reliance on the old rule; there was an equal likelihood that
he concealed his income to avoid prosecution for embezzlement.
Though no element of reliance is present, the James decision is responsive to the principle that the retroactive operation of a rule imposing or expanding criminal liability would be inherently unfair.
In a few jurisdictions, courts may convict persons of crimes even
though the conduct charged against them is nowhere specified by statute as criminal.4 4 These jurisdictions punish so-called "common law
offenses," acts that fall expressly or by analogy within some common
law decision, however ancient and obscure. Predominantly they are
acts characterized as immoral, obscene, or in some such wise offensive.
These so-called "morals offenses" create refractory problems of
retroactivity. Usually a defendant cannot divine that a decision will
make criminal the conduct he engaged in. Retroactivity in the common law of crime, attended by penal sanctions, may be particularly oppressive when the defendant's conduct lacks any element of mens rea.
It is reasoning in a circle to attribute consciousness of wrongdoing to
42. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
43. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 102 Fla. 886, 136 So. 601 (1931);
State v. Bradbury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (1939); State ex rel. Maples v. Quinn, 217
Miss. 567, 64 So. 2d 711 (1953); Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110
A.2d 788 (1955).
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a defendant on the sole ground that since his conduct is now adjudged
offensive to widely held community standards of basic morality, its
criminal nature should have been known to him.
It may avail little to a defendant to exercise his right to a jury trial
when charged with an allegedly criminal offense, not against a person
or property, but against the abstraction of public morality. Given that
indeterminate abstraction, randomly selected jurors have the same
large discretion as a trial judge to adjudge conduct criminal that has
nowhere been so specified.
Judicial discretion, whether of trial judge or jury, is also an indeterminate abstraction elusive of constitutional limitation. An appellate
court is wary of countermanding the discretionary judgment of the
triers of fact unless there is patent abuse of their discretion, a phrase
whose own vagueness matches the abstraction to which it relates. Thus
two indeterminate abstractions, one encompassing conduct allegedly
criminally offensive and the other encompassing judicial discretion to
adjudge conduct as criminally offensive, interact to create a vicious circle. It might better be described as a vicious vortex, into whose
vacuum every person risks being drawn. It is a very present danger
whose sinister aspects ironically are camouflaged by the ceremonious
judicial process through which it moves. The courtroom, whose judges
and jury are regarded as the intent guardians of fair procedure, lends
itself to a vitiation of the procedure whenever the guardians freely invoke their discretion to stigmatize conduct as criminal and to apply the
punishment retroactively.
Transcending the injury to the one thus condemned by the erratic
operation of judicial discretion is the oppressive censorship it threatens
to all others. Even if the threat does not materialize immediately or on
a large scale, it exerts a damaging influence against the diversity of custom and thought that characterizes the open pluralistic society. Those
aware of the threat tend to stifle themselves, to fit their conduct to prevailing patterns, to speak only the speech of the sickly sweet lest they
offend a majority well able to mobilize its deadly innocence against any
questioning words.
As for those who are not aware of any threat, or are not in fear
of it, they risk more imminent injury. The first among them to be
criminally prosecuted may be those whose offenses are so close to specified crimes as to seem properly punishable. But each such punishment broadens the area of prosecution and the number of those who
may be caught in it. No one can forget that in our own time, in pur-
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portedly civilized countries, millions have thus been caught who have
committed no greater offense than to be themselves.
In Ginzburg v. United States,4 5 three of the four dissenting justices
viewed the majority decision as a retroactive expansion of criminal liability for conduct not hitherto specified as a crime. The decision, interpreting a federal statute on obscenity,4 6 adjudged the defendants guilty
of mailing obscene matter. Even though the majority opinion assumed
that the magazines actually mailed were not obscene, it attributed to
the mailing an obscenity derived from the manner in which the magazines were advertised and prepared for mailing. Thus the court greatly
broadened the sweep of an already sweeping statute. Something new
has been added to the normal question under such a statute: What
was defendant doing? It is now in order in the courtroom to ask:
What did he think he was doing?
With this subtle interpolation of motive in a statute on its face concemed only with obscene matter, whatever that vague term may mean,
what are the limits of the growth possibilities of obscenity as a crime?
Those who prosecute for obscenity need not prove that the defendant
was murdering the English language or even roughing it up. The crucial
question is not only how the defendant conducts himself, but whether
his motive was pure. Evil to him who evil thinks.
The pudding, of course, is in the proof. Since the proof of evil
motive is not called for by the statute, Ginzburg could have become
an endless pudding, spilling into little ones into every corner of the
United States. It is not quieting to envisage the many custodians of
morals who perennially stand ready to put in their plums, and pull out
their thumbs, and say: What a good boy am I.
The plum puddings in the United States are no more spectacular
than those of the mother country. The Ginzburg case finds a foggy
47
peer in the English case of Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
highlighting the durability of the conspiracy net in common law. The
defendant published a "Ladies' Directory," listing the names and addresses of prostitutes. He was convicted of publishing an obscene
booklet under the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, superseding common law rules hitherto governing obscene publications. He was also
convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, an offense declared
by the trial judge to be a common law misdemeanor. The Court of
45.
46.
47.

383 U.S. 463 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
[1962] A.C. 220.
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Criminal Appeal affirmed the conviction and the House of Lords reaffirmed. In the reaffirmation, the majority adhered to a view of the
court as custos morum of the people, as they say in English, or as Latins
might say, the moral custodian. There was an oddly archaic sound to
the purportedly forward-looking speech of several that equated the
conspiracy conviction with the right and duty of the court to keep the
common law of crimes responsive to current public policy. Thus Viscount Simonds declared, "The law must be related to the changing
standards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the popular
will but having regard to fundamental assessments of human values and
'48
the purposes of society."
Lord Reid dissented, stating that "[w]here Parliament fears to
tread, it is not for the courts to rush in. . .. [T]he courts cannot
now create a new offense, or a new kind of criminal conspiracy
.... "'I In 1973, ten years after the Shaw case, over a vigorous and
persuasive dissent by Lord Diplock, the House of Lords held in
Knuller, Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions0 that the publishers
of InternationalTimes were properly convicted of conspiracy to corrupt
public morals by publishing advertisements by homosexuals for companionship with other homosexuals. In this case Lord Reid voted with
the majority despite his continuing belief that Shaw was wrongly decided and that under its 1966 Practice Statement the House of Lords
was free to abandon erroneous earlier decisions. He justified his concurrence in Knuller on the ground that there had been at least thirty
convictions for the new crime in the intervening ten years and that Parliament had enacted relevant statutes without repudicating the rule in
Shaw's case. In his view general acceptance of that rule had made it
law and "however wrong or anomalous the decision may be it must
stand and apply to cases reasonably analogous unless or until it is altered by Parliament." 51 I would here reiterate my own view that the
responsibility of overruling judge-made bad law rests with judges and
should not thus be shifted to Parliament. I do not believe that bad
law becomes enshrined by a supposed public acceptance that may be
no more than public indifference. Law, good or bad, is made by courts
and legislatures operating under appropriate judicial or legislative procedures, not by public indifference or acquiescence.
48.

Id. at 268.

49.
50.

Id. at 275-76.
[19721 2 All E.R. 898.

51.

Id. at 903.
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Vagaries in the criminal law of conspiracy in sequence of Shaw
and Knuller have a disturbing range of propagation, as in the rule that

a conspiracy to commit a tort is criminal. Thus in the Kamara case,5

students from Sierra Leone who protested against the policies of the
party in power in their country and wished to call public attention to
their grievances were prosecuted for occupying the premises in London of the High Commission for Sierra Leone. They were convicted

on a charge of conspiracy to trespass, and the Court of Appeal affirmed
their convictions on the syllogism that an agreement to do an unlawful
act is a criminal conspiracy; trespass is an unlawful act; an agreement
to commit trespass is therefore a criminal conspiracy. The major premise not only begs the question, but begets others. As Lord Diplock
declared in his dissent in Knuller: "Ml]t is the height of sophistry to
say that the doing of the acts in concert which alone can have harmful

consequences is not what the law regards as meriting punishment, but
that the prior agreement to do them is."58
Such curious outcroppings of judicial creativity in a normally staid
domain are not rendered safe and sane by virtue of bearing tags of
prestigious authority. Nonetheless we can view Shaw, Knuller, and
Kamara as aberrations. The traditional defenses against retroactivity

of new rules of criminal law that would adversely affect a defendant
are still firmly entrenched. 54
52. Kamara v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] 2 All E.R. 1242.
53. [1972] 2 All E.R. at 921.
54. There may be a trend toward retroactivity of new rules that would beneficently
affect a defendant. Contraction of criminal liability can take various forms: a court
declares a criminal statute unconstitutional; a legislature repeals a criminal statute expressly or by implication, or repeals a statute and later substantially reenacts it; or a
court reinterprets a criminal statute to the advantage of defendants, either by narrowing
the scope of the statute or by articulating new defenses to it. These examples warrant
examination.
In the simplest example, when a court declares a criminal statute unconstitutional.
the invariable rule is that all defendants previously convicted under that statute are entitled to release, whether their convictions are final or not. The rule is at least as old
as an 1879 case in which the United States Supreme Court declared that a conviction
under an unconstitutional statute is void and therefore subject to collateral attack. See
Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879).
As for legislative repeal of a criminal statute, it was normally attended at common
law by automatic abatement of all prosecutions under it, on the presumption that the
legislation intended repeal to operate as a pardon for past acts. Abatement did not extend, however, to final convictions, probably because of the originally limited nature of
habeas corpus and general unavailability of remedies via collateral attack in early AngloAmerican law. Moreover, since there was no abatement the legislature clearly could not
have intended a pardon, as when the new statute merely affected the manner of punishment, or merely took over the field from the old, or substantially reenacted the old, as
in the case of codifications, consolidations or revisions.
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We turn now to the cluster of recently formulated constitutional
The problems of legislative repeal are exemplified in two modern cases decided by
the Supreme Court. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). In Bell, "sit-in" demonstrators had been convicted of
criminal trespass. While their case was pending on writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court, the Maryland legislature enacted "public accommodation" laws
that gave them a right to be in public restaurants and therefore probably rendered the defendants' supposed trespass noncriminal. Like many states, Maryland had a "saving
clause" to avoid the common law rule of automatic abatement on repeal, but there was
some doubt whether the clause applied to petitioners' convictions. The Supreme Court
therefore reversed and remanded to the Maryland court to determine whether under state
law the prosecutions against petitioners might be deemed abated under the new statute.
The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356,
204 A.2d 54 (1964).
In contrast, in Hamm, petitioners' "sit-in" conduct had been rendered noncriminal
by a federal statute, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). The United
States Supreme Court held that the convictions, still on direct review when the Civil
Rights Act was enacted, were abated by the federal statute rendering their conduct noncriminal.
An analogous situation arises when a court reinterprets a criminal statute so as to
narrow it, thus essentially repealing the statute as to some defendants. In this area, one
decision aroused much criticism. See Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1941). In Warring, a defendant had been convicted in 1939 under a federal contempt
statute that punished conduct in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." At the time of the defendant's conviction case law
required a causal rather than a geographical link between the offending conduct and the
offended court. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). Two
years after Warring's conviction, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself, holding
that the contempt statute required geographic proximity between conduct and court.
See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). Under this new interpretation, Warring
might not have been guilty of criminal contempt, but the court denied habeas corpus.
A comparable decision has been rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
a case where the petitioner had been convicted of first degree felony-murder in the
course of a robbery. His victim, a policeman, had actually been killed by a bullet from
the gun of a fellow policeman during the fracas of the robbery. Commonwealth ex rel.
Almeida v. Rundle, 409 Pa. 460, 187 A.2d 266, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 815 (1963). Long
after the petitioner's conviction the Pennsylvania court adopted a new theory of felonymurder that could have removed his crime from that category. See Commonwealth v.
Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). The Pennsylvania court, however, denied
habeas corpus in Rundle, holding that criminal convictions are to be governed by the
law in force at the time of the conviction. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Almeida v. Rundle, 374 U.S. 815 (1963).
Sometimes there are legislative changes in punishment. They are usually subject
to a rule precluding retroactive application to defendants whose convictions have become
final. Such a rule is of course inevitable as to increases in punishment, where retroactive application would not be constitutionally permissible under the usual ex post facto
clause. As to statutes mitigating punishment, however, there is no constitutional barrier
to retroactive application, and there are compelling arguments in its favor. Once the
legislature adopts a lesser penalty as adequate, the retention of the harsher penalty no
longer serves any legitimate penological goal. Hence we declared in California that
when a criminal statute is amended to mitigate punishment after the prohibited act was
committed, but before a final judgment of conviction is entered, the amended statute governs. See In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 448, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965).
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rules relating to criminal detection, detention, and trial.5 5 They begin
with the Bill of Rights as applied to the states via the fourteenth amend-

ment, an application that has gained momentum since the propelling
concept of ordered liberty enunciated in Palko v. Connecticut.5" They
culminate in rules that would be beneficent to the defendant if retroactively applied.
It would seem that since the new rules have a common ground
in the concept of ordered liberty, defined as "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,""7 they
would by definition be of universal application. Hence they would
reach backward in time as well as forward, to apply retroactively even

though they might upset final judgments. Thus the United States Supreme Court declared in 1963 that "conventional notions of finality of
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."55s

Since that noble declaration the Court has applied some but not
all of the beneficent rules retroactively. Why not all? The question
is basic, compelling us to seek out the considerations that in some cases
dictated prospective operation only.
The fourth amendment cases demonstrate that rules of ordered
liberty might operate with less than absolute retroactivity, however absolute a ring they have in the abstract. The fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by government agents, and Mapp v. Ohio59 extended to the states the
The rationale of Estradawould seem to be equally applicable to a defendant whose
judgment of conviction has become final. An early case decided otherwise. See State
v. Addington, 18 S.C.L. Rpts. 516 (1831). The petitioner in that case was convicted
of horse stealing and sentenced to death. Meanwhile an amendment to the penal statutes reduced the punishment to whipping, imprisonment, and a fine. The court refused
to apply the lesser punishment retroactively on the ground that it loses all power over
a case once a judgment becomes final. It nevertheless recognized the harshness of the
rule and strongly recommended executive clemency.
Modem decisions extending the scope of habeas corpus have militated against such
unbending finality of judgments in criminal law. Moreover, in states such as California,
a system of indeterminate sentencing serves to keep a petitioner's case open. The Adult
Authority may redetermine his sentence at any point up to the maximum term. CAL.
PNr. CoDE §§ 1168, 3020, 3023, 5077 (West 1970).
55. See generally Address by Roger Traynor, 'The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, And Trial," Twenty-third Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, April 19, 1966, in 33 U. Cm.
L REv. 657 (1966).
56. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57. Snyder v.Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
58. Sanders v.United States, 373 U.s. 1, 8 (1963).
59. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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federal rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of that amendment. Mapp generated concern throughout the country as to whether
it would apply retroactively not only to cases on appeal but also to final
judgments. In my own state I confronted the problem in a concurring
opinion in In re Harris.60 Some years earlier in People v. Cahan,61
California had anticipated the Mapp decision by adopting the exclusionary rule. Instead of making it a rule of constitutional dimension,
however, we made it a rule of evidence. Hence its violation afforded
no ground for collateral attack on final judgments. It was perforce
turned into a constitutional rule by Mapp, and the question arose as
to whether it must now apply with full retroactivity. In deciding
against such retroactivity, in In re Harris, I noted that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is not to protect the guilty but to deter unconstitutional police practices. It seems clear that deterrence would be
served but little more and at exhorbitant cost by affording the weapon
of collateral attack to those defendants who were convicted before the
adoption of the exclusionary rule and hence had no way of challenging
the admissibility of the evidence.
The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of conviction is that it operates to eliminate the risk of convicting the innocent. Such a risk attends any conviction ensuing from the witting use
of perjured testimony, the suppression of evidence, an involuntary confession, the denial of an opportunity to present a defense, and the denial of the right to counsel. A comparable risk arises upon failure to
provide an indigent defendant with a trial transcript necessary to perfect an appeal.
The most telling distinction of a defendant convicted on evidence
resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure is that he is clearly
guilty. It is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule to protect the
guilty. Its purpose to detect lawless enforcement will be amply served
in any state by affording defendants an orderly procedure for challeng62
ing the admissibility of the evidence at or before trial and on appeal.
60.

56 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 366 P.2d 305, 306, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890 (1961).

The

rule of Mapp would apply, as in Mapp itself, to cases that had not yet reached final

judgment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). See also Vandenbark v. Owen-Illinois Glass
Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
61. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
62. See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 DuKr L.J. 319;
Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search And Seizure Practices, 34
RocKy MT. L. REv. 150 (1962).
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The views set forth in the Harris case gained strength when the
United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker63 decided against
any retroactive application of Mapp that would upset judgments that
became final before Mapp. It invoked as a test "no likelihood of unreliability" in the factfinding process. 4 Given reliability, the Court was
free to weigh official reliance and the advantages of orderly transition
against the usual factors in favor of retroactive application of judicial
rules.
New problems of retroactivity were soon to arise in the now famous cases that have worked basic changes in criminal procedure
through the usual ordered liberty route of the fourteenth amendment.
When Malloy v. Hogan65 extended to the states the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, it cast a formidable shadow on a
rule followed in six states allowing comment on the defendant's failure
to take the stand to explain or deny facts when he could reasonably
be expected to do so. Nevertheless, we still felt free in California to
uphold such a rule in People v. Modesto,6 6 reaffirming the validity of
a state constitutional provision that allowed restricted comment on the
silence of a defendant in a criminal trial. My opinion in that case, however, proved to be only the next to the last words in my state. It is
now displaced by the famous last words of the United States Supreme
67
Court in Griffin v. California.
The United States Supreme Court relied at least in part on the
theory that the comment rule impaired the reliability of the fact-finding
process. Given this relation back to the Linkletter test, it seemed logical that the Griffin rule would be given the retroactive application
adumbrated in the Linkletter test. In the subsequent case of Tehan
v. United States ex rel. Shott,66 however, the Court considered the appropriateness of retroactivity under a new test: Was there a "clear danger of convicting the innocent" unless there were retroactive applica63. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Some of the most significant cases since Linkletter, in
addition to those discussed in the text, in which the United States Supreme Court has
applied its new rules prospectively include Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972);
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646
(1971); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S.
631 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
64. 381 U.S. at 638.
65. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
66. 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
67. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
68. 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
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tion of the beneficent new rule? This language is not a restatement
on all fours with the Linkletter test: Would there be "no likelihood
of unreliability," in the factfinding process, and hence no likelihood of
convicting the innocent if there were no retroactive application?
It was no easy matter for the Court, after it had taken its stand
in Griffin against comment, to decide in Tehan against complete retroactivity of the Griffin rule. This compromise was designed to preclude
the Griffin rule from upsetting final judgments in the jurisdictions that
had allowed comment.
Once the Court undertook such adjustment, it gained freedom to
decide against any retroactive application of the new rules on police
interrogation announced in the historic cases of Escobedo v. Illinois6 9
and Miranda v. Arizona.70 It came as a surprise, however, that when
it did so in Johnson v. New Jersey,7 1 it specified a cutoff date that is
baffling except in terms of expediency. Even though the case arose
on habeas corpus and hence could have been governed by the Linkletter and Tehan tests, the Court chose to reject the final judgment cutoff. It held instead "that Escobedo affects only those cases in which
the trial began after June 22, 1964, the date of that decision. We hold
further that Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after
' 72
the date of our decision one week ago."
The Court made this choice between the two alternatives it postulated: whether the rules "shall affect cases still on direct appeal when
they were decided or whether their application shall commence with
trials begun after the decisions were announced." 7' Apparently it departed from the final judgment cutoff because it would have been compelled to apply the Escobedo and Miranda rules to cases then pending
on appeal, something it did not wish to undertake.
The Court's choice is hard to justify, whatever its expedience. It
meant that no cases would be reversed in consequence of the new rule
during the given transitional period. It is difficult to reconcile the
Court's own reference to immutable principles and to binding guarantees newly discovered in the century-old fourteenth amendment with
a declaration that they are to have no effect until after June 22, 1964.
From among the cases pending that raised the Miranda issues, the
Supreme Court applied the Miranda rule to only 4 and denied certi69.
70.
71.

378 U.S. 478 (1964).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
384 U.S. 719 (1966).

72.
73.

Id. at 721.
Id. at 732.
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orari in the remaining 129 cases. The denial of relief from imprisonment or death on the basis of an arbitrary date raises a grave question
of equal protection. If those whose cases were pending were reliably
found guilty and hence did not deserve relief, the inequity remains that
a few among them nonetheless did receive relief.
So glaring an inequity is not dispelled by a rationalization that the
lucky few were only incidental beneficiaries of a technique designed
to avert wholesale reversals. For better or worse, the technique of the
Johnson case is on the books, open to further use. We can anticipate
that it will be urged by advocates seeking to make palatable a proposed
change in criminal law or even in civil law. Thus a technique envisaged as an interim expedient may invite carelessness and induce
otherwise reluctant judges to join in the announcement of a new rule.
It can be used to temporize whenever a new rule is announced too precipitously for consistent and equitable application.
There is wisdom in the Linkletter and Tehan tests that preclude retroactivity to the extent of upsetting final judgments, when
there is no appreciable risk that innocent defendants have been convicted. Without such risk, the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes
collateral attack on final judgments in civil cases, should apply with
equal force in criminal cases. Precluding complete retroactivity by adherence to conventional doctrine does not present any question of prospective overruling. The new rule is applied retroactively within the
conventional limits that have traditionally governed the application of
new rules.
There is no wisdom, however, in the technique invoked in Johnson v. New Jersey.74 Equal justice before the law has been the proud
boast of Anglo-American judges for generations. Why then give 4
defendants, Miranda, Vignera, Westover, and Stewart, the benefit of
the new rule and deny it to the other 129 defendants whose pending
cases also raised the Miranda issue? As Justice Harlan has noted in
another case, 75 the court was "[s]imply fishing one case from the
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
to flow by unaffected by that new rule.

. . ."71 It was purely fortui-

tous that the case of the four lucky defendants given the benefit of the
new Miranda rules was heard ahead of the other cases. As Justice
74. Id.
75. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
76. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "Too many irrelevant
bear upon the rate of progconsiderations, including the common cold,
77
ress of a case through the judicial system."
The apparent reason for this lack of evenhanded justice was to
meet the case or controversy test in article III of the United States Constitution, and to render the new rule invulnerable to the claim that it
would have been mere dictum had it been applied prospectively only.
In my opinion the question whether a new rule should be applied prospectively is just as much an issue in a case as the question whether
the old rule should be displaced at all.
Before considering the why of a prospective overruling decision,
we must understand that it is the culmination of a process involving
two issues. First, in the course of pondering the hitherto governing
rule in the context of the instant case and any relevant predecessor
cases, a court decides that it is inadequate or inept and must give way
to an appropriately formulated new rule. It must then go on to decide
whether it will operate most justly if it is given the usual retroactive
application to the very case before the court that has provided the impetus toward a new rule. If the court decides against retroactive application, as in a case where it would work undue hardship upon a party
that has justifiably relied on the old rule, it is driven to a dual resolution
of the problem in a bifurcated decision, announcing the new rule for
prospective application only and allowing the old rule to apply in the
case before the court.
Each part of the bifurcated decision springs from an actual controversy between the parties. The decision to liquidate the old rule
springs from its unfitness to govern such cases. The decision to pay
final respects to the doomed rule springs from such considerations as
the justifiability of a party's reliance on an old rule, given that it may
induce reliance by the very authority of its existence, if not by its fitness. It bears emphasis that each part of the decision is essential to
78
a proper resolution of the case. Neither is dictum.
The parties should have an opportunity to be heard on each issue
and the court should have the benefit afforded by adversary litigation
of the briefs and argument of counsel thereon. 7 By continuing a case
77. Schaefer, The Control of "Sunburst": Technique of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 645 (1967).
78. See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,
51 VA. L. REv. 201, 216-27 (1965); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 151 (1940).
79. See Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 936-
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for such briefs and argument when it is not yet clear whether prospectivity will be an issue, a court ensures that the resolution of such an
issue will not have to await a subsequent case. It thus precludes the
uncertainty that would otherwise bedevil counsel and other courts in
the interim.
Furthermore, the issue of retroactivity should not be decided summarily as the United States Supreme Court has done. A reasoned
opinion should demonstrate why the issue was resolved as it was.
Assertion without reasons is unnecessary when reasons are available... and unwise in any circumstance; it leads too easily to the
suspicion that the law of the case is based upon power alone,
and not upon reasoned analysis and judgment.80
Moreover, I find inadequate such criteria as the Supreme Court
has invoked for governing the issue of prospectivity, namely, the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and the effect on the administration of justice."1 The inadequacy lies mainly in the failure to weigh against the
foregoing considerations the hardship and inequity suffered by those
who are denied the benefit of the new rule and compelled to bear the
burden of what is now admittedly recognized as an unjust rule. Their
hardship, particularly when imprisonment and death are at stake, would
seem to outweigh the reliance of law enforcement agencies and the increased burden on the administration of justice that equal treatment
of those equally situated would entail.
The foregoing review of the technique of prospective overruling
as it has developed in the United States illustrates its possibilities for
developing the law rationally in the interest of justice by repudiating
unsound doctrine. The review also notes the dangers of inept use of
the technique and the need not only for caution but for rational criteria
to govern its proper use. It was properly used, I believe, in many of
the illustrations I have set forth, but improperly used in such cases as
Johnson v. New Jersey."2
The criteria I would suggest are: clear demonstrations that a
precedent must be overruled, that the new rule is the best of all possible replacements, and that the hardship on a party who has relied on
the old rule outweighs the hardship on the party denied the benefit
of the new rule. Since there are few cases where such rigorous demon80. Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 939.
81. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
82. See United States ex rel. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966).
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strations can be made, there should be few occasions when prospective
overruling can justifiably displace the normal retroactive application of
an overruling decision.
We turn now to the outlook for prospective overruling in England.
For generations the House of Lords deemed itself without power to
overrule its decisions. Thus as early as 1860 in Attorney General v.
Windsor,"8 Lord Campbell noted that House of Lords decisions "are
binding upon itself when sitting judicially, as much as upon all inferior
tribunals. . . . [They] can be altered only by Act of Parliament."84
Again in 1861, in Beamish v. Beamish8 5 Lord Campbell declared that
if a House of Lords decision "were not considered as equally binding
upon your Lordships, the House would be arrogating to itself the right
of altering the law, and legislating by its own separate authority."86
There are echoes of Blackstone in this magisterial declaration beaming
the message that when the House decides a case, it is merely finding
the law, but when it overrules a case, it is legislating. The doctrine
that the House could not overrule itself took firm hold in 1898 in London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council8 7 in which Lord
Halsbury noted the "disastrous inconvenience--of having . . . the
dealings of mankind rendered doubtful .
"8...
,8 One can only muse
how much the dealings of mankind might have improved with the benefit of a doubt now and then properly dubbed as a judicial deliberation.
Only in 1966 did the House at long last liberate itself from the bondage of Windsor, Beamish, and London Tramways in its famous Practice
Statement of that year. 89 I quote the statement in full because its substance and implications are essential to any analysis of the prospects
of prospective overruling in English law. Such analysis would have
been idle in an era when the single word "overruling" was not pronounced in polite reasoning circles.
The 1966 Practice Statement provides:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent (1) as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its
application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree
of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of
their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal
rules.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

11 Eng. Rep.472
Id. at 481.
11 Eng. Rep. 735
Id. at 761.
[1898] A.C. 375,
Id. at 380.
[1966] 3 All E.R.

(1860).
(1861).
380.
77.
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Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also
unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose,
therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former
decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements or
property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also
the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House.9 0
Note the word "retrospectively" in the third paragraph of the
statement. Even without that word the statement assures the public
that the House will bear in mind the danger of any disturbance of the
basis on which contracts et cetera have been entered into. If such assurance were all that was intended, the word "retrospectively" is redundant. It seems likely that their Lordships included the word "retrospectively" to demonstrate their awareness of the normal retroactivity
that attends any overruling. A determined advocate of prospective
overruling might also hypothesize that the excess caution on retrospective disturbance was intended to leave the way open for prospective
-overruling in the light of the experience with that technique in the
United States, with which the House was undoubtedly familiar.
Despite the 1966 Practice Statement, the House of Lords has
abided by traditional pre-1966 techniques. Thus in Conway v. Rimmer,91 the House was faced with the broad language in Duncan v.
Cammel9 2 that if the Crown asserts that the production of a document
would be "injurious to the public interest" or that secrecy of a class
of documents is "necessary for the proper conduct of the public service," that assertion is final and conclusive and the document need not
be produced. As Professor Julius Stone has noted:
This was a rather unlimited proposition. The House, nevertheless,
found it possible in Conway v. Rimmer in 1968 (that is, after the
1966 Practice Statement) to sweep the proposition aside without
departing from it. What they rather said was that, however solemn
and unanimous Viscount Simon's formulation, and however wide
his intention, the House was dealing with Duncan's case with naval
documents about submarines in wartime; while they were now dealing in Conway v. Rimmer with police reports. He was dealing
with centralized government operations, they were dealing with
90. Id.
91. [19681 A.C. 910.
92. [1942] A.C. 624.
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And they pointed to half-a-dozen differentiae

The reluctance of the House of Lords to turn over the new leaves
of the 1966 Practice Statement results in such puzzlers as the Jones
v. Secretary of State for Social Services case.9 4 Four Lords, Wilberforce, Dilhorne, Diplock, and Simon, agreed that Dowling's case, 95 a
previous decision of the House of Lords, was wrong. Only three of
them, however, were convinced that the House should overrule that
case under the 1966 Statement. The fourth, Lord Simon of Glaisdale,
was unwilling to do so. The remaining three Lords, Lord Reid, Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest, and Lord Pearson, were of the opinion that
Dowling's case was right, but that even if it were wrong, the House
should not overrule it. Thus the baffling conclusion is that the admitted unsoundness of a precedent does not justify overruling it.
Dowling's case involved a claim for injury benefit under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts. The case held that a decision by the statutory authorities that the injury occurred in an accident
arising out of and in -the course of the claimant's employment was final
and binding on the medical authorities with respect to a subsequent
claim for disablement benefit based on the same accident. If Dowling's case was wrongly decided then not only were Dowling, Jones,
and similar claimants awarded disablement benefits that Parliament
had not authorized, but claimants to whom the medical authorities
would have awarded disablement benefits were denied benefits Parliament contemplated they should have. The doctrine of res judicata,
however, would preclude collateral attack on final judgments in either
class of case. Had their Lordships undertaken to overrule Dowling's
case they would have restored the statutory plan envisioned by Parliament and precluded new departures from that plan. Such a course
would have done no violence to the reasonable expectations of claimants; it is hardly credible that they would have accidents in reliance
on such a rule as that in Dowling's case. Administrative adjustments
to a new rule presumably could be made without undue difficulty, but
in any event administrative practices should be in accord with those
contemplated by Parliament.
93. Stone, On the Liberation of Appellate Judges: How Not To Do It!, 35
MODERN L. REV. 449, 462-63 (1972).
94. Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services, [19721 1 All E.R. 145.
95. Minister of Social Security v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1967] 1 All
E.R. 210.
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Although no question of reliance by either claimants or administrative agencies was presented in the Jones case, such a question might
conceivably arise in a future case, given the failure in the Jones case
to overrule a precedent that the majority deemed wrong. Nonetheless,
a party could hardly make a plausible case for reliance on the basis
of an already dubious precedent. There should hence be no obstacles
to an outright overruling of the precedent if it is again placed in issue.
In my opinion Dowling's case should have been overruled in the
Jones case. Moreover, the now admittedly sound interpretation of the
Parliamentary scheme should have been applied retroactively, for there
are no plausible reasons for applying that interpretation prospectively.
In the "afterthoughts" of his speech in the Jones case Lord Simon
voices his own unease with the decision in light of the 1966 Practice
Statement. He noted that he was
left with the feeling that, theoretically, in some way the most satisfactory outcome of these appeals would have been to have allowed
them on the basis that they were governed by the decision in
Dowling's case, but to have overruled that decision prospectively.
Such a power-to overrule prospectively a previous decision but
so as not necessarily to affect the parties before the court- is
exercisable by the Supreme Court of the United States, which has
held it to be based in common law: see Linkletter v. Walker.98
Lord Simon went on to observe that the pretense that judges were not
makers of law but merely its discoverers and expounders had its value.
Ui]n limiting the sphere of lawmaking by the judiciary (inevitably
at some disadvantage in assessing the potential repercussions of
any decision, and increasingly so in a complex modern industrial
society), and thus also in emphasizing that central feature of our
constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament. But the true, even if
limited, nature of judicial lawmaking has been more widely acknowledged of recent years; and the declaration of 26th
97 July 1966
may be partly regarded as of a piece with that process.
An advocate of prospective overruling would subscribe to the use
of that technique by their Lordships, and indeed by the judges of the
Court of Appeal once they are unchained from Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.,9 8 as "no more than a logical extension of present realities
and of powers already claimed." The advocate would find encouragement in Lord Simon's suggestion, and Lord Diplock's concurrence
therein, that such an extension should be "seriously considered." The
advocate, however, would hardly agree that such an extension "would
96.

[1972] 1 All E.R. 145, 198.

97. Id. at 198.
98.

[1944] 1 Y-B. 718.
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preferably be the subject matter of Parliamentary enactment." The
problem is so manifestly a judicial one that the responsibility for its solution on a case by case evolution in the course. of the traditional judicial
process should remain with judges. Prospective overruling calls for
sensitive and timely adjustments. There is no reason for judges to abdicate such a uniquely judicial responsibility. Legislators cannot formulate a definitive all-purpose plan for prospective overruling that
would be feasible.
An advocate of prospective overruling would not be dissuaded by
Lord Simon's objections that the initiative for such a task should not
be taken by the House of Lords itself. The answer to his Lordship's
objections, in the order in which he presented them, might be somewhat as follows: In the first place, if there is informed professional
opinion that their Lordships have no power to overrule decisions with
prospective effect only, that alone should not be an insuperable obstacle. Although such opinion should always be seriously considered
and may be one source of law, it is not itself law and is not binding
on their Lordships "sitting judicially." Secondly, any suspicion that an
amplification of the 1966 Practice Statement by the House would "be
endeavouring to upset one-sidedly the constitutional balance between
executive, legislature and judiciary" could be allayed by a clear demonstration that a precedent had to be overruled, that the hardship on the
party who had relied on it outweighed the hardship on the party denied
the benefit of the new rule. Moreover, as Lord Diplock has noted,
it "is not an essential feature of the judicial process" that a new precedent be applied retroactively. 9 One might add that it is not essential
to the constitutional balance that only the legislature make a precedent
operate prospectively.' 0 Thirdly, the concomitant problems his Lordship noted as worthy of serious consideration are at most tangential to
the technique of prospective overruling.
99.

Address by Lord Diplock, "The Courts As Legislators," Presidential Address,

The Holdsworth Club, 1965.

100. Indeed, there is a serious question in the United States whether the legislature
can even do so. The California Supreme Court overruled an old precedent on state constitutional grounds that had governed the taxation of private leaseholds on tax-exempt
public property.

It applied its new rule retroactively after weighing the considerations

pro and con. Then the legislature came into the picture and after weighing the considerations on its own scales, retimed the new rule so it would not apply retroactively to
leases negotiated prior to its adoption. When this legislative retiming was put to the
test in Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, we upheld it, stating:

"[T]emporary application of the rule of an overruled case may be prescribed by appropriate legislation as well as by judicial decision, for the legislature is no less competent
than the court to evaluate the hardships involved and decide whether considerations of
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I have saved to the last a 1675 case 1 discovered by Professor
Leach in which Lord Nottingham set forth the general Chancery pol-

icy that those who relied on overruled statements of law "are to be protected." In this case
[i]t appears that there was a 'received opinion' that a certain Elizabethan statute did not apply to the Crown; a tenant then laid out
money in erecting a building in reliance upon that opinion. When
the law was declared to be otherwise in a decided case, 0it2 was held
that the 'new law' was inapplicable to the relying tenant..

I believe that it would be appropriate for the House of Lords to
resurrect this 1675 Chancery decision of Lord Nottingham and to am-

plify the 1966 Practice Statement by adopting the technique of prospective overruling. 0 3 Cautiously and skillfully used in exceptional cases
where retroactive overruling would be demonstrably unjust, it would
fairness and public policy warrant the granting of relief." Forster Shipbuilding Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 459, 353 P.2d 736, 741, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29
(1960). It bears noting that the court did not make retroactivity a constitutional mandate. It viewed retroactivity as a problem turning on considerations of fairness and policy. This multiparous problem begets many such considerations, and they may be just
as much the concern of the legislature as of the court. See also Elder v. Doerr, 175
Neb. 483, 22 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
Cases may of course arise in which retroactivity is a constitutional mandate, as in
the new rules designed to preclude the risk of convicting the innocent. In such a case
a legislature would be bound by the retroactivity of the rule, as much as by the rule
itself, as the last word.
101. Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases, 73 Selden Society 182 (1954). "But then
in Chancery when men act according to an opinion which hath long been current for
law, they are to be protected, although a latter resolution have controlled the former
current opinion, as in Magdalene College case, the resolution in the 11th report (11 Co.
Rep. 66b) being contrary to a received opinion which for a long time held the King
not to be bound by 13 Eliz., c. 10, the tenant who had laid out money in building upon
that opinion was protected in his lease against the resolution by Lord Ellesmere's decree,
and the like case was again decreed by the Lord Bacon C., between Long & Dean and
Chapterof Bristol,for which see 1 Rolle, 378, (S), 2 [Prolegomena, c.30, s 30]." Id.
102. W. LEAcH, PRoPERTY LAw INDiCTED, 16-17 (1967); Leach, Divorce by Plane
Ticket in the Affluent Society-With a Side-Order of Jurisprudence, 14 U. KANS. L.
Rnv. 549, 558 (1967).
103. See Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking And Prospective Overruling, 29
MoDEiN L. Rnv. 593, 605 (1966). That author states, 'qt is unlikely that English
courts-still much more strongly wedded than American courts to the Blackstonian doctrine-will adopt, eo nomine, any theory of 'prospective overruling.' But the House of
Lords, in one of its recent major lawmaking decisions, found another way of doing virtually the same thing. In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords could have been content
to dismiss the action on the ground that the defendants had excluded any legal responsibility for their statement. It chose instead to enunciate, in a series of elaborate opinions,
a future principle of responsibility for financial statements negligently made under circumstances in which third parties can reasonably be expected to rely on them. The
House of Lords overruled Candler v. Crane, Christmas& Co. with respect to future situations. And while it has been suggested that the entire series of judgments may be dis-
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implement the purpose of the 1966 Statement to preclude injustice in
a particular case and serve the proper development of the law. Useful
lessons and analogies could be drawn from the now substantial experience with the technique in the United States. Meanwhile, law reform
resulting from Parliamentary adoption of proposals of the Law Commissions of England and of Scotland and the various Royal Commissions would not only implement the prospective overruling -technique,
but also serve to reduce the number of occasions where it would be
necessary to invoke it.
If the House of Lords undertakes the humble task of eradicating
weeds from a splendid garden of law, it will do honor to a profession
as noble as the painstaking gardeners who tend this beautiful land.

missed as obiter dicta, this is unlikely. The decision thus operates as a 'prospective over-

ruling.'"

Id. (citations omitted).

See also Stevens, Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial

Creativity and Doctrinal Possibility, 27 MODERN L. REv. 121 (1964); Stevens, The
Role of a Final Appeal Court in a Democracy: The House of Lords Today, 28 MODERN
L. REv. 509 (1965); Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963
SUPREME CT. REV. 211.

For other cases in which new rules were in effect applied prospectively only, see
Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 1254 (rule that a count of murder should stand alone would no longer be followed; new rule not applied to Connelly);
Cassell & Co. v. Broome [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (affirmed judgment on exemplary dam-

ages based on prior case, but set forth detailed rules "for the future"). Prospective operation of new rules is also accomplished by characterizing them as "rules of practice."
See Friedland, Prospective And Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. ToRoNTO L.J.
170, 185 (1974).

